Labor Law—State Fair Employment Practices Acts—The Power of the States to Act in the Field of Job Discrimination in the Face of Current and Proposed Federal Activity.—Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm\u27n v. Continental Airlines by Frost, Jerome K
Boston College Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 31
1-1-1964
Labor Law—State Fair Employment Practices
Acts—The Power of the States to Act in the Field of
Job Discrimination in the Face of Current and
Proposed Federal Activity.—Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines
Jerome K. Frost
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerome K. Frost, Labor Law—State Fair Employment Practices Acts—The Power of the States to Act in
the Field of Job Discrimination in the Face of Current and Proposed Federal Activity.—Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 5 B.C.L. Rev. 458 (1964),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol5/iss2/31
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeals, in Local 383, Laborers v. NLRB,8°
specifically overruled the NLRB's position. It appears from this decision
that it is legal to use coercion to obtain a hot cargo clause but illegal to
use coercion to enforce such an agreement. 31 The Court of Appeals was
probably correct in its literal interpretation of the statute, but the question
arises whether Congress purposely excluded construction unions from section
8(b) (4) (A) or whether Congress inadvertantly created a loophole in the
law.
The argument that even though the agreement is valid it is still un-
enforcible82 does not satisfactorily resolve the question. The real inquiry to
be considered is whether or not the union has the right to subject an employer
to coercion for the purpose of obtaining an unenforcible agreement. Since this
right appears to be based only on the wording of the statute—section 8(b)
(4) (A)—perhaps the statute should be changed.
Except in the construction industry, the law relating to hot cargo
clauses is becoming settled. In the garment industry, unions may legally
obtain and enforce hot cargo agreements without being subjected to section
8(b) (4) (B) .33
 In other areas of commerce and industry, hot cargo clauses are
illegal and a violation of section 8(e)3 4 Current law in the construction in-
dustry has left hot cargo clauses totally unenforceable even in judicial pro-
ceedings.88 Thus, the clause will only have meaning where the employer
voluntarily chooses to comply with it. Perhaps in its next go-around at
improving labor legislation, Congress will take a stand on whether hot cargo
clauses should be banned in the construction industry or should be given the
legality and enforcibility of other contract provisions.
ROBERT M. STEINBACH
Labor Law—State Fair Employment Practices Acts—The Power of the
States to Act in the Field of Job Discrimination in the Face of Current
and Proposed Federal Activity.—Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n
v. Continental Airlines.'—Petitioner applied for an available position as an
airline pilot with respondent. Upon being rejected, he complained to the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission, which, acting under the authority
89 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963). The litigation involving Local 383 extended over
several years, and it illustrates the diversity of opinion between the NLRB and the
courts. In 1961 the district court granted a temporary injunction against the union
for a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B), but the court refused to find a violation of
section 8(b)(4) (A). Kennedy ex rel. NLRB v. Local 383, Laborers, supra note 29.
In 1962 the NLRB held in Local 383, Laborers, supra note 27, that the union had
violated section 8(b) (4)(A) in picketing to obtain a hot cargo agreement. The union
appealed from the Board holding and the Court of Appeals reversed.
81 Local 383, Laborers, v. NLRB, supra note 30.
82 Ibid.
88 Section 8(e), LMRA, supra note 13.
84 NLRB v. Local 17, Lithographers, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962); Local 9, Typog-
raphers v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
85 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers, supra note 1 .
1 372 US. 714 (1963).
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of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957,2 found that petitioner was
denied employment solely because of his race. Respondent was ordered to
cease and desist such discriminatory practices and to enroll petitioner in its
next training course. On review, the District Court of the City and County
of Denver set aside the Commission's order and dismissed petitioner's com-
plaint on the ground that the Colorado Act could not constitutionally be ap-
plied to an air carrier in interstate commerce. The court stated that this state
action imposed an undue burden on commerce and that Federal law had pre-
empted the field of protecting citizens employed in interstate commerce from
racial discrimination!' The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, addressing it-
self only to the Commerce Clause issue. 4 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 5 HELD: Federal law, in the form of Congressional Acts
and Executive Orders, has not preempted the field of protecting employees
in interstate commerce from this type of discrimination in employment.
In response to the demand for anti-discrimination legislation, and in
view of federal inactivity in this area, the states have enacted a vast body
of anti-discrimination laws. In particular, since 1945 twenty-five states have
adopted Fair Employment Practices Acts. The Colorado Act is typical of
statutes in force in twenty states in that it establishes a board to hear, in-
vestigate and adjudicate complaints, to enjoin violations, and to compel
affirmative action to remedy any individual wrong.° The state commissions
have, as a matter of course, assumed jurisdiction over employers within the
state operating in interstate commerce.' Prior to the instant case, this juris-
diction had never been directly challenged in federal or state courts. 5
The Commerce Clause ramifications of the assumption of jurisdiction
over employers in interstate commerce has been well documented elsewhere.°
2 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, Colo. Rev. Stat. 44 80(24)(1)-
80(24)(8) (1960 perm. supp.). 80(24)(6) makes it unlawful for an employer "to
refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of
compensation against, any person otherwise qualified, because of race, creed, color,
national origin or ancestry." 80(24)(7) confers on the Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Commission broad investigatory and enforcement powers. 4 80(24)(8) provides for
judicial review and enforcement of Commission orders.
a 6 Race Rel. Rep. 805 (1961).
4 — Colo. —, 368 P.2d 970 (1962).
5 371 U.S. 809 (1962).
6 E.g., Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1957 and 1962 Supp.); N.Y. Executive
Law 44 290-301; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43 44 951-963 (1952 and 1962 Supp.). For a
complete list of state fair employment laws, see 5 Lab. Rel. Rep. 393, 394 (1960).
7 Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-
discrimination Legislation, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526, 566 (1961); 5 Lab. Rel. Rep., 393,
394 (1960).
For a subsequent state case in accord with the instant case see Delaney v.
Conway, 39 Misc. 2d 499, 241 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Supreme Court 1963).
a On the Colorado Supreme Court level: 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1348 (1962); 76
Harv. L. Rev. 404 (1962); 37 Ind. L.J. 490 (1962); 37 Notre Dame Law. 720 (1962);
15 Stan. 523 (1963); 35 Colo. L. Rev. 211 (1963); 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033 (1962);
48 Va. L. Rev. 1149 (1962);
On the U.S. Supreme Court level: 32 Cinn. L. Rev. 313 (1963); but see 37 Notre
Dame Law. 720 (1962).
In the instant case the Supreme Court takes a rather oblique approach to the
Commerce Clause issue, placing the emphasis upon the racial discrimination aspect
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However, recent federal activity in the form of decisions interpreting broad
anti-discrimination provisions in federal statutes regulating interstate com-
merce, and executive orders requiring the insertion of an anti-discrimination
clause in government contracts, raises the more subtle issue of federal occu-
pation of the field to the exclusion of state action."
The problem of federal preemption is an extremely tacky one and its
resolution requires a determination of precisely what the state is attempting
to do in the case at hand, and an examination of the relationship of the fed-
eral and state interest and powers involved." It is settled that state legis-
lation against racial discrimination is a valid exercise of the police power
of the states. 12
 On the other hand, the Constitution vests in Congress the
power to regulate "commerce among the States,"" and the power to stip-
ulate terms and conditions of government contracts inheres in the Executive."
Thus, when the state police power is exerted against employers engaged in
interstate commerce and subject to Federal Executive Orders, this particular
application of, state power transforms what was by its nature an exercise of a
reserved power, into an exercise of a power that may be deemed merely
rather than upon the employment relationship aspect. A more traditional approach, fol-
lowing Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99 (1876) might have been taken, but probably
would not have produced so decisive a result.
to The preemption question also raises itself with respect to power of the NLRB
to prevent unfair employment practices; J. M. Albert discusses five devices the Board
might use: (1) decertification of unions which discriminate against negroes; (2) the
setting aside of representation elections where an employer or a union makes "exacer-
bated" appeals to racial bias; (3) the removal of discriminatory collective bargaining
contracts as bars to representation petitions by stranger unions; (4) the prevention
of a union, acting in its "statutory representative capacity, from taking action
against any employee upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invid-
ious, or unfair," and the prevention of employer participation in such conduct; (5) the
making it an unfair labor practice for an employer or a union to make such exacerbated
appeals .to racial bias in a representation campaign as would support the setting aside
a representation election.
Mr. Albert points out that the remedial powers of the NLRB in this area are
limited and concludes that these devices, some of which are less effective than others,
make a poor substitute for an effective federal fair employment program. NLRB-
FEPC2, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 549, 558-93 (1963).
Preemption in this area would probably follow the decisions on this issue under the
NLRA, as amended. For a discussion on the unique preemptive effect of the NLRA,
see Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 Harv. L. Rev.
529 (1963) and Peralta, Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Management Relations Under
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act: The Aftermath of the Lincoln Mills Decision,
22 Rev. Col. Abo. P.R. 79 (1961).
11 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-46 (1963); Head
V. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1963); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297-302
(1961); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-510 (1956) ; California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
330 US. 767, 772 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 US. 52, 67 (1941).
12 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 US. 100, 110 (1953); Rail-
way Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945).
IS U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 US. (12 How.)
299 (1851).
14 People v. Tremaine, 226 App. Div. 331, 235 N.Y. Supp. 555, 563-4, (1929);
citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
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permissive, involving as it does an encroachment into an area where the fed-
eral interest is dominant and federal jurisdiction paramount.
Absent an express federal declaration of an intent to exclude state
action,15 the degree of permissiveness of state regulation depends on the
relative predominance of the federal interest nieasured against the seriousness
of the local concern and the urgency for local action. In an area of supreme
federal interest and importance, the federal power borders on the exclusive
and the coincidence of a state with a federal regulation will usually mean the
invalidation of the former.'° Where, however, the dictates and exigencies of
national policy do not require uniform regulation or untrammeled federal
action and the overwhelming importance of the federal interest is less readily
apparent, and where the state's concern in the matter is genuinely grave
and the need for state action critical, the tendency has been to allow the state
to take action. In particular, when the challenged state law attempts to apply
the police power to attain a legitimate state end, the Supreme Court has
taken a long, hard look at the realities of the situation.
Formally the enterprise is one of the interpretation of the Act of
Congress to discover its scope. Actually it is often the enterprise..
of reaching a judgment whether the situation is so adequately
handled by national prescription that the impediment of further
State requirements is to be deemed a bane rather than a blessing.' 7
15 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 11, at 501-502; Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York State Labor Relations Bd., supra note 11, at 780 (Frankfurter's con-
currence).
16 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 11, at 504 (invalidation of state law
making sedition against the federal government a state offense) ; Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 413-14, 418-19 (1948) (invalidation of California law
making all those ineligible for federal citizenship ineligible for commercial fishing
license); Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (dictum); Hines
v. Davidowitz, supra note 11, at 67-74 (invalidation of Pennsylvania statute imposing duty
of registration upon aliens); but see, Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202-210
(1944) (upholding of Minnesota foreign corporation law to a firm engaged in foreign
commerce). See also note on trade regulation dealing with constitutionality of a state
statute proposing labeling of goods imported from foreign countries, 4 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 631 (1963).
17 T. R. Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause and the State
Police Power, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 607 (1928), quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Bethlehem
Steel, supra note 11, at 783.
In the following cases the state law was upheld: Head v. New Mexico Bd., supra
note 11, at 429-32 (state law on professional advertising against claim of preemption by
Federal Communications Act); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra note
11, at 141-52 (California statute requiring all avocados imported or sold in state to
have a higher minimum oil content than required by federal standards); Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (application of city smoke abatement
ordinance to federally licensed steamship); California v. Zook, supra note 11 (statute
duplicating requirement of ICC certification); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 741-2, 747-51 (1942) (application of state labor law
to prevent strike violence); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 529-40 (1912) (Indiana law
requiring disclosure of formulas on foods offered for sale in state while in interstate
commerce against claim of preemption by Pure Food and Drug Act).
In these cases the state law was invalidated: Campbell v. Hussey, supra note 11
(Georgia statute requiring tagging of tobacco subject to federal grading and identifica-
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Accordingly, if the demand for prevention and elimination of discrimination
in employment is acute and an effective solution to the problem necessitates
resort to all available means; both national and local, the courts should not be
too quick to imply a federal intent to exclude state action.
That racial discrimination in employment is not only a matter of sub-
stantial local concern and a valid object of state regulation, but also a prob-
lem demanding immediate and decisive action on all levels, is a proposition
few would contest's Further, it is difficult to see any overriding national
policy imperative in this area such as would necessitate, or even make desir-
able, the foreclosure of state regulation. Ultimately, whether a state Fair
Employment Practices Act may be applied to an employer in interstate com-
merce and subject to federal executive orders should depend upon whether
the federal government has explicitly declared an intent to interdict state
regulation, or upon whether federal activity in the area is so pervasive and
so intensive as to make the existence of coincidental state regulation a real
impediment to the achievement of the federal goal, and so make the con-
clusion of such intent inescapable.
—In the instant case, 12
 the Court unanimously rejected the respondent's
contention that the Civil Aeronautics Act,2 ° now the Federal Aviation Acts'
tion regulations) ; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 US. 236 (1959)
(application of tort law and labor relations statute to conduct arguably within compass
of § 7 or § 8 of NLRA, as amended); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S.
148, 159-69 (1942) (application of state food and drug law to federally controlled
manufacture of renovated butter) ; Missouri R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927) (state
law prohibiting rail carriers from making agreements limiting liability for cargo loss);
Charleston & W.C.R.R. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 601-09 (1915)
(state law establishing standards of liability for loss on rail carriers different from those
of Act to Regulate Commerce) ; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 124-37 (1913)
(state law proscribing labels on glucose mixtures permitted by Pure Food and Drug
Act).
An examination of these cases reveals that the state statute win usually be upheld
when it achieves a result the Supreme Court deems desirable and does not deny the
working and effect of a federal regulation or abridge what approaches being a federally
granted right. Some cases are close, and might well have gone either way.
18 "Every recession demonstrates the old adage that the Negro is the first fired
and the last hired. The Negro unemployment rate in the 1960 decline, for example, was
roughly double that for whites. . . Whether direct or indirect, the price of dis-
crimination comes high. . . . From menial work, job insecurity, and unemployment,
the stifling circle of discrimination leads on to slums, family instability, and school
drop-outs. . . . At worst it means miseducation, juvenile delinquency, vice, and police
brutality. Beyond all this is waste of human resources, loss of latent skills, and above
all a blight on our moral stature." W. Mendelson, Discrimination/Based on the Report
of the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1961). See also, United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights, Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights
(1962); United States Commission on Civil Rights, Employment (1961); United States
Commission on Civil Rights, the Fifty States Report (1961); Senate Special Comm.
on Unemployment Problems, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Studies in Unemployment, 173-223
(1960); and Senate Special Comm. on Unemployment Problems, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Readings in Unemployment (1960).
19 Supra note 1, at 722-25.
20 52 Stat. 973, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-722 (1952 ed.).
21 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958 ed.).
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the Railway Labor Act,22 and Federal Executive Orders requiring the inser-
tion of an anti-discrimination clause in government contracts 23 had occupied
the field of preventing employment discrimination by an interstate air carrier.
There is nothing in the Civil Aeronautics Act or its successor that indi-
cates any Congressional intent to occupy the field of protecting airline em-
ployees from job discrimination. Its broad anti-discrimination provision 24
aims primarily at protecting customers from discriminatory practices, espe-
cially in the setting of rates.25 It does strictly regulate the hiring of flight
personnel and prescribe the necessary qualifications for employment as an
airline pilot, but these regulations relate chiefly to health and safety. 26 Even
assuming, as did the Court in the instant case, that the Act extends to the
banning of racial discrimination in employment and that the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency can use their
broad certification power to prevent job discrimination by airlines, the lack
of a manifestation of a Congressional intent to exclude state legislation in this
field, together with an utter failure by the federal agencies to exert any
authority they may have in this area, scarcely furnishes a rational basis for
rejecting the application of a state fair employment measure against an
airline.
The Railway Labor Act, certain provisions of which apply to airlines,27
has been held to prevent exclusive bargaining agents, acting under its author-
ity, from discriminating against minority groups which they are bound to
represent, and it has even been applied to enjoin employers from carrying
out discriminatory agreements. 28 But the force of the Act is directed pri-
marily at unions: it imposes on them the duty of fair representation; its
effect on employers is tangential. It carries no mandate to refrain from unfair
employment practices per se and cannot be held to bar the application of
state Fair Employment Practices Acts to employers.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Federal Executive Orders on
government contracts apply to airlines carrying mail and that they could
22 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. H 151-188 (1958).
23 Executive Order No. 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953) ; Executive Order
No. 10557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (1954) ; Executive Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977
(1961), revoking and superseding previous orders.
24 49 U.S.C. 1374(6) (1958). "No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall
make, give or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any partic-
ular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect
whatsoever or subject any person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air trans-
portation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage in any respect whatsoever." H 1422-23 and 1429 confer authority over
certification that could be invoked to sanction any discriminatory practices by airlines.
25 Compare Interstate Commerce Act § 30), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1958) and the
cases under it. The Civil Aeronautics Act has been held to prevent racial discrimination
against customers. Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1956).
28 People v. Western Airlines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, appeal dismissed, 348
U.S. 859 (1954).
27 §§ 151, 152, 154-163, 181-188.
28 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944); Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
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preclude state action," there is not the slightest hint that the Executive in-
tended to oust state regulation in their field of operation."
The Court's decision on the issue of supersession is proper. The federal
interest involved is not so predominant as to militate against state action.
Nor has Congress or the Executive evinced an intent to supersede state Fair
Employment Practices legislation; nor does there exist a comprehensive and
effective federal regulatory scheme governing the area such as would support
an implication of federal preemptive intent.
The Court did not squarely locate the position of state laws against job
discrimination in its relation to federal law, and, consequently, did not clearly
indicate what would be the status of such laws if the federal government
were to decide to take more affirmative action in this field. On the strength
of what the Court has said on the preemption issue, however, it may be pos-
sible to delineate the area of permissible state action and to predict with
some degree of certainty the limiting effect of future federal action.
The Court quotes conflicting language dealing with the result reached
when federal and state action in a particular field coincide:
When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand,
coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be
declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has
seen fit to go."
On the other hand, "[the mere] fact of identity does not mean . . . the
automatic invalidity of state measures."" In upholding the validity of the
Colorado Act against the contended preemptive effect of the Civil Aeronautics
Act, the Court relied on its decision in California v. Zook" and dicta in
22 It is not certain that they could. The orders in question were not issued under
specific congressional authorization or under express Constitutional authority. If a
federal executive order could foreclose state action, the test would have to be at least
as strict as that for Congressional acts.
32 The use of executive orders to ban discrimination by government contractors
began in 1941 with the issuance of Executive Order 8802, 6 F.R. 3109. Subsequent
executive orders continued and extended the program. E.O. 9346, 8 F.R. 7183 (1943);
E.O. 9664, 10 F.R. 15301 (1945) ; E.O. 10308, 16 F.R. 12303 (1951); E.O. 10479, 18
F.R. 4899 (1953); E.O. 10925, 26 F.R. 1977 (1961), revoking and superseding previous
orders. All of the orders establish primary responsibility for enforcement with the
particular contracting agencies. They cover a very limited -area, contain no express
declaration of preemptive intent, and furnish scarce support for implying such an intent.
They do, however, state the urgent need for full equality of employment opportunity.
As to the desirability of state action, the President's Committee on Civil Rights
declared in 1947: ". . . The enactment of a federal fair employment practice act will
not render similar state legislation unnecessary." To Secure These Rights, 102 (1947).
Executive Order 10479 charged the Committee on Government Contracts to "establish
and maintain cooperative relationships with agencies of state and local governments."
Executive Order 10925 urges cooperation with all agencies in order to obtain compliance
with the order by all "representatives of workers" who are or may be engaged in
work under government contracts.
31 Charleston & W.C.R. R. v. Varnville Furniture Co., supra note 17, at 597,
604 (1915).
22 California v. Zook, supra note 17, at 730.
32 Ibid.
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Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd. 34 to the effect
that the states will be allowed to act in areas of substantial local importance
unless it is impossible to reconcile concurrent state and federal exercise of
power. It appears, then, that the Supreme Court does not consider the interest
of the federal government in regulating unfair employment practices supreme
and exclusive, and that nothing short of an actual conflict between a state
and federal regulation will be held to bar state efforts to eliminate such
practices.
What will happen if and when the federal government embarks on a
broad fair employment practices program would thus depend upon how
comprehensive and pervasive the program is, and upon whether or not
an accommodation of federal and state interests and policies can be achieved.
Absent an expression of federal preemptive intent, the courts should hesitate
to imply such an intent unless it is impossible to reconcile dual regulation
in this area.35
If a strong federal program is enacted with explicit provision for its
effect on existing state laws, the preemption issue would appear only in
limited contexts 46
 But, if such provision is lacking the prospect of effective
34 Supra note 11.
35 Bills proposing a federal fair employment practices program now pending in
Congress include: H.R. 27, 316, 330, 405, 1967, 3523, 4031, 4573, 4874, 4896, 4915,
6120, and 6692, and S. 773, 1210, 1211, and 1937, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963). All
the Senate bills are available for hearings. Of the House bills only 405 has been acted
upon. It was reported out with amendments by the Committee on Education and Labor
on July 22, 1963. H.R. Rep. No. 570 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963).
H.R. 405 and S. 1210 (hereinafter cited as H. and S., respectively) are typical.
The program they propose is a comprehensive one and should provide for effective
regulation. In substance, with the exception of the number of employees or union
members necessary for jurisdiction, their provisions are identical with those of the
strong state acts. They seek:
(1) the permanent establishment of a Full Employment Opportunity Com-
mittee. H. § 7; S. § 6.
(2) the assumption of jurisdiction over all employers and labor unions with a
designated number of employees or members. H. § 3; S. § 3.
(3) the outlawing of "unlawful employment practices." H. § 5; S. § 5.
(4) the empowering of the Committee to hear, investigate and adjudicate com-
plaints, to enjoin violations, and to require affirmative action necessary
to redress individual wrongs. H. § 10; S. § 7.
(5) the conferring on the Committee the power to make rules and regulations
necessary to obtain the ends of the Act. H. § 18(a) ; S. § 13(a).
(6) the establishment of a procedure for judicial review and enforcement of
Committee orders, with exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. H. § 11;
S. § 8. Both provide for agreements whereby the federal body would
refrain from administering the program if it is satisfied that the state
agency is doing an effective job. H. § 12(b) ; S. § 7(a). Absent such an
agreement, the. Senate measure would expressly preclude state regulation,
§ 7(a), while the House bill would expressly permit it. § 12(a). It is
difficult to perceive any desirable effect exclusion would have.
36 Where state action is expressly excluded, the question is much more likely to
arise: e.g., when the employer or union has fewer than the jurisdictional number of
employees or members, when the state act imposes more rigid standards or proscribes
activity not forbidden by the federal law, or when the statute of limitations exceeds
that of the federal measure, or before effective federal regulation has become a fait
accompli.
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federal administration makes a sure prediction on how much leeway will be
allowed the states at least theoretically difficult.
The existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme would afford
ample grounds for implying Congressional intent to foreclose state action.
There would always be the danger of a "mischievous conflict," produced when
the federal and state agencies, acting on the same subject matter and
applying similar standards, arrive at different results. 87 The problem of
"forum-shopping" would also arise." A consideration of the practicalities of
the situation, however—the necessity for immediate and thoroughgoing action,
the demonstrated ability of at least some of the states to accomplish results,
and the sheer inadequacy of any federal program, however grandly conceived,
to reach and regulate every aspect of the problem and to remedy every indi-
vidual wrong technically within the scope of the act—outweighs the diffi-
culties and dangers threatened by concurrent federal and state regulation.
Indeed, it is submitted, if any area calls for concerted action, it is that of
employment discrimination. The decision in Colorado v. Continental should
have the effect of encouraging rather than limiting such action, regardless of
potential Congressional action.
JEROME K. FROST
Securities Exchange Act—Treatment of Intrastate Use of Telephone.—
Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc.'—and Nemitz v. Cunny. 2—In the
Rosen case, the plaintiff brings an action under Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19343
 alleging misrepresentations and failures to dis-
close by the defendant during transactions for the sale of securities con-
ducted in part through telephone conversations. At the time of the telephone
conversations both parties were within the city limits of Philadelphia. In this
hearing on a motion which the court treated as a motion for summary
judgment, the fundamental issue concerned the determination of whether
this use of the telephone was a transaction in interstate or intrastate corn-
87 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., supra note 11,
at 775.
Pennsylvania, six of whose cities have Fair Employment ordinances, provides
for an election of forum by the party and then foreclosure. It also provides for the
possibility of conflict by declaring that the state rule is to be applied by municipal
courts in event of conflict. Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43, 962(b).
1 218 F. Supp. 473 (ED. Pa. 1963),
2 221 F. Supp. 571 (ND. Ill. 1963).
2 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 4 78j (1958).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange
. 	 .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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